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Process Sociology, the English School and Postcolonialism -  
Understanding ‘Civilization’ and World Politics: A Reply to the Critics 
 
Andrew Linklater 
Introduction 
I must first of all express my deep gratitude to the Review of International Studies for 
including this wide-ranging forum on Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems 
(hereafter V&C) in this issue. I am especially grateful to John Hobson for the original idea of 
organising the exchange and for his towering introduction which deserves a wide readership 
in its own right as a major reflection on the postcolonial critique of V&C that runs through 
much of the discussion.
1
 All of the contributors deserve my thanks for generously engaging 
with the book in rigorous and challenging ways and for pressing me to clarify and extend key 
parts of the argument. 
Several of the articles in this exchange argue that the synthesis of process sociology 
and English School analysis which is at the heart of V&C is guilty of Eurocentrism. The 
claim is advanced explicitly by L. H. M. Ling, Julian Go and Gülşah Çapan and, implicitly, 
by Alan Chong and George Lawson, while Hobson occupies an adjoining position in that he 
accepts some of their contentions but provides his own rebuttals. It will become apparent that 
                                                          
1
 I have also profited greatly from his immensely detailed comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. 
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I believe the critique misfires in large part because of the assumption that the book provides a 
study of the ‘rise of the West’ which ignores or underestimates the role of non-European 
agency. Large issues are raised by that line of argument. There has been little systematic 
discussion of process sociology in International Relations and no investigation, as far as I 
know, of the relationship between its explanation of the European ‘civilizing process’ and 
postcolonial inquiries into the civilizational dimensions of world politics. The recurrent 
charge of Eurocentrism in the Forum, and Hobson’s insightful distinction between two 
versions of this perspective, invite closer analysis of the relationship between those 
standpoints. Much of the following reply to the critics is devoted not only to defending a 
synthesis of process sociology and the English School but also to arguing that process 
sociology outflanks postcolonial reflections in important respects, particularly by virtue of its 
analysis of power struggles in relations between ‘established’ and outsider ‘groups’ within 
social figurations. The stakes in the discussion are high and revolve around largely-neglected 
issues about the sociological study of long-term social and political processes that have 
special relevance for the future of International Relations as a ‘post-Western’ academic 
discipline.  
The discussion below presses home some of the advantages of process sociology over 
other approaches in the social sciences by contending that central themes in postcolonialism 
are best understood from the standpoint of Elias’s explanation of the ‘civilizing process’.2 
The aim is to turn the tables on some of the critics by inviting them to rethink some of their 
effervescent lines of argumentation in the light of that mode of sociological inquiry. The task 
is not simply to react to the critics but also to outline possible future avenues of inquiry into 
                                                          
2
 Norbert Elias, On the Process of Civilization: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic 
Investigations (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2012/1939). 
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the comparative study of ‘civilizing processes’ which build new bridges between historical 
sociology and International Relations. The following reflections on the potentials for 
integrating elements of process sociology, postcolonial analysis and English School 
reflections on international society are designed to contribute to that ongoing endeavour. 
The paper is in five parts. The first summarises core objectives of V&C which are 
overlooked in some of the critiques and which lead to distorted views of its main purposes. 
The second responds to the criticisms of the synthesis between process sociology and English 
School inquiry which is developed in Lawson’s article. It considers Tim Dunne’s and Richard 
Devetak’s argument that the final chapter of V&C exaggerates the novelty or distinctiveness 
of the most recent phase in the development of international society. The third section 
explains what the book is not (namely a study of the rise of the West which endorses the ‘big 
bang’ approach which Hobson describes in his deliberations on the postcolonial critique of 
the volume) while the fourth deals with the related contention that the argument of V&C is 
Eurocentric. The penultimate section uses process-sociological concepts to explain distorted 
interpretations of V&C that arise in the postcolonial contributions to this Forum. The final 
part of the reply promotes the synthetic project noted earlier by highlighting research areas 
that will hopefully become more central to IR as scholars from different regions reshape an 
Anglo-American dominated discipline that is constrained by a lack of understanding of, and 
serious engagement with, some of the best work in Sociology. 
 
On the Processual Analysis of Violence and Civilization  
Before proceeding to reply to the critics, it is necessary to comment on the project of which 
V&C is part and to expose the errors of the interpretation that the book provides ‘a linear and 
progressive narrative’ shackled to a ‘triumphalist teleology’ (Çapan, this issue) and, in 
4 
 
addition, to reject the contention that it presumes there was an ‘inevitable march towards 
European modernity’ that was driven by an indestructible capacity for ‘self-rectification’ in 
the face of violence and suffering (Ling, this issue). V&C is the second part of a three-
volume study of ‘the problem of harm in world politics’ (hereafter PoH), the eponymous title 
of the first volume which will conclude with a long-term perspective on the relationship 
between social and political symbols and global ‘harm conventions’. 3  The first volume 
emphasised the tension within recent studies of world history over whether significant 
changes have taken place outside the technological domain and whether it is possible to 
identify progressive developments including the widening circle of moral concern between 
societies (and, more specifically, on whether the history of Western brutality, greed and 
exploitation have consistently outweighed the West’s more ‘beneficent and humane’ 
qualities).
4
 V&C extends the argument of PoH that the gulf between the two standpoints is 
not as great as it may initially appear to be.  
The process-sociological analysis of European state-formation as discussed in chapter 
four of PoH and developed in V&C is incompatible with linear, progressive narratives, 
teleological explanations and faith in historical irreversibility. State-formation and the inter-
related development of notions of civility and civilization gave rise to deep tensions within 
European patterns of social and political development. Modern states amassed extraordinary 
destructive capabilities that were intertwined with colonial expansion and the global 
transformation of human societies. The concept of civilization which was a crucial part of the 
                                                          
3
 Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Hobson provides a summary of harm 
conventions in his introduction. 
4
  Linklater (2011), p. 166. 
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self-consciousness of colonising groups
5
 was repeatedly employed to justify nineteenth-
century imperial expansion and colonial violence. But as the sixth and seventh chapters of 
V&C showed, discourses of civilization were also used to condemn imperial cruelties that 
were deemed to be incompatible with ‘civilized’ existence. Criticisms of V&C that were 
noted at the beginning of this section fail to take account of the ambiguities of the idea of 
civilization in the history of the modern states-system. The persistence of those ambiguities is 
evident in how the concept is often deployed in the West to condemn ‘barbaric’ practices 
such as the death penalty and to authorise using force against contemporary ‘savage’ terrorist 
organisations.
6
 One of the aims of V&C is to understand changing balances of power 
between the different faces of ‘civilization’ and antecedent notions of refinement and restraint 
in the Western states-systems. 
A second theme in PoH which is relevant to my later response to the supposed 
Eurocentrism of V&C was that there have been many scholarly studies of the ‘impact of non-
European civilisations on Western development’; however European states ‘created the 
international political framework that now embraces the entire world’.7 There may come a 
time, the argument continued, when Western principles of international relations are largely 
forgotten and when they only interest scholars who are curious about the history of 
civilisations and international relations. Future scholars may well pass judgment on the 
historical legacy of the Western states-systems. They may debate whether it laid the 
foundations for more successful ‘efforts to reduce or eradicate violent and non-violent harm’ 
or left a legacy of unprecedented global interconnectedness and associated social and political 
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 Elias (2012/1939), p. 17. 
6
 See my ‘Torture and Civilization’, International Relations, 21: 1 (2007), pp, 119-30. 
7
 Linklater (2011), p. 24. 
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conflicts without ‘parallel moral developments’ that greatly reduced the incidence of violent 
and non-violent harm in world politics.
8
  
The postcolonial critics of the supposedly progressive narrative of V&C overlook that 
position on the ambiguities of the European ‘civilizing process’ which is reaffirmed in the 
introduction to the book where it is stated that the ‘central question’ in the investigation is 
‘whether modern ethical attitudes to the use of force are significantly different from the 
prevalent assumptions about violence and suffering in the earlier Western states-systems’.9 
Some parallels in the writings of Wight and Elias were discussed to explain that focal point. 
The former observed that ancient Greeks and Romans appeared to have had little or no 
conception of ‘international ethics’ that acted as a restraint on violent harm. Wight stressed 
the differences between the states-systems of classical antiquity and the modern international 
order where moral sensitivities to the use of force appear to be more developed.
10
  My 
argument in V&C is that there is a striking parallel with Elias’s observation about the 
contrasts between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ responses to what is now known as genocide. 
Images of the Holocaust produced shock and revulsion amongst ‘civilized’ peoples, not least 
because of the realisation that one of them – another advanced, technological society – had 
organised unprecedented mass slaughter on an industrial scale. But, according to Elias, such 
                                                          
8
 Linklater (2011), p. 25. 
9
 Linklater (2016), p. 1. 
10
 In support of that conjecture, he referred to the Western Allies’ rejection of Stalin’s alleged 
suggestion that the German General Staff should be liquidated at the end of the Second 
World War. The clear implication was that societies that belonged to what he described as the 
‘simpler civilizations’ of antiquity were, in the main, untroubled by the summary execution 
of vanquished enemy leaders (see Linklater 2016, p. 1). 
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massacres were commonplace in classical antiquity, and invariably passed with little 
comment or condemnation.
11
 
Wight’s remarks, the discussion continued, co-existed uneasily with his claim that 
international politics constitute ‘the realm of recurrence and repetition’. For their part, Elias’s 
references to the impact of ‘civilized’ self-images on modern perspectives on state-organised 
violence sat awkwardly alongside the bleak observation that little seems to change in world 
politics other than the methods of killing and the number of people involved (or alongside the 
similarly dark statement that ‘civilized’ peoples in the modern period are still living much as 
their ancestors did ‘in the period of their so-called “barbarism’”).12  
The introduction to V&C speculated that few scholars ‘would claim that international 
relations have barely changed across the centuries apart from successive revolutions in the 
instruments of warfare’ but ‘few would contend that the relationship between morality and 
politics is the same today as it was in earlier phases in the history of the modern states-
system, or in the earlier systems of states in the West’. But such judgments, it was claimed, 
are ‘largely impressionistic’ rather than based on systematic comparisons. There has been 
little empirical research that sheds light on what is and what is not distinctive about 
‘international ethics’ in the modern period. On that basis, V&C set out in a preliminary 
manner to discuss three questions: first, whether the most recent phase of the modern states-
system is markedly different from its Western predecessors; second, whether notions of 
civilization that first emerged in late eighteenth-century French court society explain basic 
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 Linklater (2016), pp. 1-4.  
12
 Norbert Elias, Involvement and Detachment (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 
2007), p. 175; Norbert Elias, Studies on the Germans: Power Struggles and the Development 
of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Dublin: University College Dublin 
Press, 2013), p. 190. 
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differences between those states-systems; and, third, what can be inferred, albeit 
provisionally, about the social and political preconditions of ethical restraints on violence that 
would mark the emergence of a more ‘advanced’ civilization than the one that emerged in the 
West. As those comments demonstrate, V&C did not set out to provide an account of the ‘rise 
of the West’ as some of the critics maintain in their contributions to the Forum. Nor was it an 
attempt to show that the European course of social and political development took place in a 
vacuum and was entirely free from non-European influences. Thos are issues to come back to 
later.  
What is central to V&C is the question of what difference, if any, conceptions of 
civilization have made to world politics. To that end, it was essential to extend Elias’s 
analysis of the ‘civilizing process’ (which had explained how ‘civilization’ superseded the 
ideas of courtesy and civility that had been prominent in elite circles in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries) by discussing some antecedent concepts in the earlier states-systems.
13
 
To begin to explain key features of the Western states-systems, the inquiry examined such 
notions as sophrosyne, clementia and virtu in European antiquity and their ambiguous role in 
permitting and forbidding violence. Those concepts contributed to the traditions or patterns of 
thoughts from which modern ideas of civilization are derived. But the primary aim was not to 
produce a history of European ideas but to analyse the conditions under which commitments 
to restraining violence have been extended to different spheres of social interaction and, most 
crucially, to relations between societies. As Stephen Mennell correctly states in this Forum, 
V&C relies on process-sociological investigations into changing balances of power between 
social groups and their world-views in the quest to identify and understand significant trends 
or directions –- or the ‘immanent order of change’ -- in different eras.  
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 Elias (2012/1939), pp. 105-7.  
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The inquiry therefore broadened the discussion of ‘the problem of harm’ in human 
societies or the tensions that exist between pressures to accumulate the instruments of 
violence to deal with external threats and countervailing imperatives to control violent 
capabilities whether for self-interested, prudential or moral reasons.
14
 V&C explains how 
modern notions of civilization as well as earlier discourses that encapsulated at least elite 
beliefs about permissible and forbidden forms of violence developed in the course of the 
‘scaling up’ of social and political organisation.15 The idea of the ambiguities of civilization 
was used to analyse changing balances of power between violent capabilities, doctrines that 
legitimated the use of force, and moral standpoints that were deployed to urge greater 
controls on violence in intra- and inter-societal relations. As the discussion will show, the 
focus was on the changing power balances between ‘civilizing’ and ‘decivilizing processes’ 
in the Western states-systems. V&C identifies limited ‘progressions’ in international society 
but it is not a ‘progressivist’ narrative that trades in the thematics of discredited nineteenth-
century philosophies of history.
16
 As Mennell emphasises in the conclusion to his paper, the 
aim of process-sociological inquiries is to understand the sociogenetic and psychogenetic 
conditions under which reversible progressions occur. That is why the analysis of V&C is 
processual but not committed to ‘a linear and progressive narrative’.  
. 
Process sociology and English School Inquiry 
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 Linklater (2011), introduction.  
15
 See Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), ch. 2. 
16
 I am grateful to Stephen Mennell for a conversation many years ago in which he used the 
distinction between ‘progressions’ and ‘progress’ to characterise Elias’s standpoint on the 
European ‘civilizing process’. 
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One of the primary objectives of V&C was to extend the synthesis of process sociology and 
English School inquiry that was explored in PoH. Prior to considering Lawson’s critique of 
that endeavour, it is necessary to stress how the narrative was shaped by complementarities 
between the two perspectives which are evident in scattered references to the ‘civilizing’ role 
of international society in English School writings.
17
 The expression was used loosely in 
those texts to refer, inter alia, to achievements in securing diplomatic agreements on 
restraints on force. There is a direct parallel with Elias’s analysis of what Europeans came to 
regard as distinctive about their ‘civilization’, but no evidence that the employment of that 
terminology resulted from engaging with process sociology. In the opening chapter of 
Systems of States, Wight argued that a shared sense of belonging to a superior culture 
(ostensibly a civilization) that was differentiated from ‘barbarian’ societies has been common 
to all states-systems.
18
 That observation was not linked with a detailed examination of the 
processes by which different peoples came to identify with the same culture or civilization. 
There was no discussion of the relationship between international society and ‘civilizing 
processes’ at the intra-societal level. The reverse problem exists in Elias’s explanation of how 
Europeans came to see themselves as ‘civilized’. Although he analysed the relationship 
between state-formation and ideas of civilization he devoted no attention to the parallel 
development of international society and the major overseas empires which were central to 
the formation of European ‘civilized’ we-images. V&C therefore highlights the connections 
between civilization and imperialism that have particular significance for the postcolonial 
engagements with the book. But it takes issue, as the following sections will explain, with 
                                                          
17
 See Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International 
Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
p. 122n9. 
18
 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1977). 
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postcolonial arguments that the volume largely ignores the impact of non-Western influences 
on the European ‘process of civilization’.  
In an important contrast with process sociology, the English School investigation of 
the expansion of international society emphasised its interconnectedness with state-formation 
and the overseas empires. ‘When the Spanish conquistadors first encountered the Aztecs and 
Incas’, Bull and Watson argued, the ‘European states were far from having repudiated the 
hegemonial principle even in their relations with one another…the doctrines of the internal 
and external sovereignty of states had not yet been clearly formulated’.19 Furthermore, the 
‘evolution of the European system of interstate relations and the expansion of Europe across 
the globe were simultaneous processes...which influenced and affected each other’ from the 
end of the fifteenth century until the recent period when power balances between the colonial 
powers and colonised peoples became less uneven.
20
 But the reality is that the English School 
and process sociology have not analysed how the interdependencies between European state-
formation, the rise of international society and the emergence of the overseas colonial 
empires drove humanity as a whole in particular directions. Neither perspective has explored 
the inter-connections between the three sides of the triangle that led to the global dominance 
of European standards of civilization.
21
  
                                                          
19
 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1984), p. 6. 
20
  Bull and Watson (1984), p. 6.  
21
 For further elaboration, see my ‘The “Standard of Civilization” in World Politics’, Human 
Figurations: Long-Term Perspectives on the Human Condition, 5: 2 (2016), (available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0005.205).  
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Lawson rejects the project of integrating what he describes as incommensurable 
perspectives in a supposedly higher-level synthesis. In his paper, he contrasts Wight’s 
‘substantialist’ approach with Elias’s ‘relational’ perspective on social-scientific inquiry. The 
contention is that the former has a static, a-historical conception of the common culture 
which is the supposed sine qua non of an international states-system. The criticism is not 
decisive as far as synthesising core elements of English School inquiry and process sociology 
is concerned. Wight’s explorations can be reworked to explore the connections between intra- 
and inter-societal ‘civilizing processes’. There is no insurmountable barrier to extending the 
inquiry in that way. However, Lawson’s second and more fundamental criticism is that 
Elias’s ‘relational’ analysis of the European ‘civilizing process’ fails to provide an adequate 
foundation for the proposed synthesis. In common with some of the more overtly postcolonial 
criticisms of V&C in this Forum, he maintains that Elias’s inquiry into the rise of European 
notions of civilization concentrated too narrowly on elite interaction within court societies. 
He argues, and this is a correct interpretation of Elias’s narrative, that the focus was on how 
dominant codes of behaviour spread downwards from the higher echelons to the lower strata 
and outwards to ruling elites in other societies.
22
 Lawson’s argument is that the analysis 
ignored the influence of voices ‘from below’ in shaping Western civilization.  
The next section considers the related argument in Lawson’s critique, which has 
strong support from the articles by Go and Ling, that V&C is equally guilty of ignoring or 
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 That was the dominant process while power relations were highly uneven, but the lower 
strata succeeded in extracting major concessions from the ruling elites as more even power 
balances developed and those elites became more dependent on the members of less powerful 
groups for the satisfaction of their interests. See Mennell, this issue, on ‘power ratios’ and 
‘functional democratisation’. Global equivalents will be considered in the discussion of 
process sociology and postcolonialism. 
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downplaying the role of non-Western ‘agency’ in that process. But there is a central point 
regarding power relations to make in response to Lawson’s critique that is also relevant to 
their postcolonial lines of argumentation. As Elias argued, it is impossible to understand the 
course of the European ‘civilizing process’ without first analysing the power asymmetries 
between the ‘established and the outsiders’ within the standard-setting societies such as 
France – and without investigating the power differentials between elite court circles and the 
lower strata which they regarded as their natural inferiors. Members of court society did not 
invite focus groups that drew together representatives from different social groups to assist 
them in defining ‘civil’ and ‘civilized’ conduct. No referendum was ever held – and none was 
contemplated - to ascertain whether the people at large consented to, or had a preference for 
exiting, the ‘civilizing process’. In the context of highly uneven power balances, the opinion 
of outsiders scarcely mattered within ‘civilized’ societies or, as I shall argue in the section on 
Eurocentrism, in relations with supposedly savage non-European peoples in the colonial era. 
Lawson does not stand alone in this Forum in ignoring those crucial power relations when 
making the case for considering the impact of ‘voices from below’ on European trajectories 
of development. The upshot is that the appropriate criticism of Elias’s ‘relational’ analysis of 
the ‘civilizing process’ and its globalisation is not that non-Western agency had far greater 
significance than he realised but that he did not take the emphasis on power inequalities far 
enough.
23
 Missing from the inquiry was the focus on how established-outsider relations 
within ‘civilized’ societies developed hand in hand with similar dynamics in the overseas 
colonies and within international society.
24
 That limitation does not of itself block the path to 
the closer integration of Wight’s ‘substantialist’ and Elias’s ‘relational’ approach. More 
specifically, the Eliasian focus on power dynamics within established-outsider relations can 
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 See Elias (2012/1939), p. 425.  
24
 Linklater, ‘Standard of Civilization’. 
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bring sociological depth to a more processual English School exploration of the 
interconnections between European civilization, colonial expansion and international society. 
A separate challenge to the synthesis of the English School and process sociology is 
advanced in Dunne and Devetak’s paper. They make the point, for which I am grateful, that 
the emergence of the European pluralist society of states should be understood in connection 
with the Utrecht Enlightenment. More fundamental is their criticism that the most recent 
phase of that society is more ‘pluralist’ and less ‘solidarist’ than the final chapter of V&C 
maintains. Doubts are raised about whether universal and egalitarian principles are deeply 
embedded in state structures and in international society echoing, it should be argued, themes 
developed in V&C.
25
 Several sources cited there implicitly recognised the need to distinguish 
between tracing the rise of more demanding social standards or expectations of restraint and 
judging how far they are widely observed for reasons of ‘conscience’ rather than because of 
external constraints including the desire to avoid domestic and/or international 
condemnation.
26
 The thesis that European governments decided that they had little choice as 
representatives of ‘civilized’ societies but to support the international convention against 
genocide (despite significant reservations) sheds interesting light on such dynamics.
27
 That 
argument is worth recalling in connection with the postcolonial criticism that the evolution of 
the universal human rights culture since the end of the Second World War often owed less to 
the Western powers than to initiatives that were taken by the newly-independent, postcolonial 
states (see Lawson and Go in this issue).
28
 Significant here is the question of how far 
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 Linklater (2016), p. 450-1. 
26
 See Linklater (2016), p. 379 and p. 394. 
27
 See Linklater (2016), p. 401ff, citing K. E. Smith, The Europeans and Genocide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
28
 Both authors refer to Steven L. G. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 
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‘civilized’ governments have been pushed in certain directions less by the force of conscience 
at certain junctures than by external pressures that opponents applied often by appealing to 
the formers’ professed role as the custodians of civilization (see Hobson on this issue, citing 
Linklater 2016, p 445).  
The vital distinction between self-restraint and external constraints is crucial to 
process sociology as Mennell notes in this Forum. It is pivotal to understanding whether the 
dominant direction is towards a ‘civilizing’ or a ‘decivilizing’ process in which internal as 
well as external restraints on violence crumble and break down. The argument in the final 
chapter of V&C focused on limited and reversible ‘civilizing’ developments in world politics. 
Some confusion on this point is reflected in the fact that some read the analysis as more 
optimistic than it actually is while others identify significant reservations. Thus, along with 
Dunne and Devetak, Mennell interprets the argument as cautiously optimist (and explains 
how changing power relations can weaken ‘civilizing’ movements),29 whereas Chong (citing 
V&C p. 370) correctly detects a note of pessimism in the discussion of whether significant 
changes in personality structures have developed alongside more cosmopolitan standards of 
restraint in the post-Second World War era. However, Dunne and Devetak raise serious 
questions about the need for more empirical research on those matters that inevitably requires 
further explorations of the emotional dimensions of world politics.
30
 That is one of many 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). I am grateful to them for this reference. Especially interesting is the 
analysis of ‘negotiated universality’ since the 1960s (Jensen 2016: introduction).  
29
 Mennell’s argument in this issue about the barriers to greater cosmopolitanism resonates 
with the discussion of ‘organised irresponsibility’ in the final chapter of V&C (see pp. 20 
below).  
30
 See Linklater (2011), chs.4-5; also R. Bleiker and E. Hutchison, ‘Forum on Emotions and 
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areas where process sociology with its interest in the ‘psychogenetic’ as well as the 
‘sociogenetic’ dimensions of the ‘civilizing process’ can be combined with English School 
analysis to develop more nuanced understandings of the ‘immanent order of change’ in 
different states-systems.  
.  
On the ‘Rise of the West’   
Hobson states in the introduction that some of the critics regard V&C as an ‘untimely’ 
example of the ‘big bang’ view of history (‘Eurocentrism I’) according to which Europeans, 
entirely unaided, raised themselves above other cultures and civilizations in their own eyes 
and proceeded to bring progress and civilization to societies that were presumed to be mired 
in ignorance and superstition. It is as if V&C provided a study of the rise of Europe or the 
West which wholly neglects the transformative influence of non-Western societies on the 
main course of social and political development that includes breakthroughs in the economic 
and technological spheres. But V&C is not a grand narrative that falls into the trap that Go 
(this issue) regards as ingrained in historical sociology more generally, namely the myopia of 
‘civilizational isolationism’. As a long-time admirer of Benjamin Nelson’s inspiring writings 
on ‘civilizational analysis and inter-civilizational relations’, I would not have considered 
taking such a path.
31
 It is worth pausing to note that Nelson argued that the so-called twelfth-
century European Renaissance was heavily influenced by rationalising drives in science, 
technology and theology in the Islamic world.
32
 Such analyses of the inter-civilizational 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
World Politics, International Theory, 6: 3 (2014). 
31
 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the 
Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 123ff. 
32
 Benjamin Nelson, ‘Civilizational Analysis and Inter-Civilizational Relations’, Sociological 
Analysis, 34: 2 (1973), pp. 79-105. 
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domain have been extended in recent years and not least in International Relations by 
Hobson’s pioneering volume on Eastern influences on Western civilization. 33  Those 
investigations deserve pride of place in any contemporary investigation of Europe’s rise to 
global dominance but, as noted earlier, V&C is not a reflection on that process. Rather, the 
primary aim was to understand the ways in which discourses of civilization have altered 
international politics in the modern era. It was to inquire into distinctive trajectories in 
different Western states-systems. Interesting questions certainly do arise about the extent to 
which non-European influences influenced the development of ‘civilized’ self-images. But as 
far as I am aware, although there are many studies of how contrasts with non-European 
‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’ were integral to the rise of ‘civilized’ identities, there are no 
detailed investigations of extra-European forces that had a powerful effect on the ‘civilized’ 
orientations to the social world that first appeared in European court societies. Thus, the 
pivotal argument that informs the postcolonial critiques in this Forum – that V&C largely 
ignores the role of non-Western political voices and initiatives in the rise of the West – 
misses its specific focus on the European ‘civilizing process’ and on the construction of the 
dominant narratives of violence and civilization.
34
 
That is not to deny the existence of important non-European social influences on the 
European ‘civilizing process’. In correspondence with me, Hobson has posed the intriguing 
question of whether and how far contacts with the Islamic world may have influenced the 
rules of behaviour regarding spitting and nose-blowing, urination and defecation which Elias 
examined in the first volume of On the Process of Civilization. A similar point can be made 
about the extent to which other aspects of the ‘civilizing process’ including treatises on the 
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art of government – the so-called ‘mirror-for-princes’ genre – as well as manuals on 
diplomatic protocols that appeared in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
influenced by regular interactions between European and non-European court societies.
35
 In 
this issue, Go asks, ‘but did the “West” learn absolutely nothing about statecraft or civility 
from interacting, over centuries and at multiple registers (economic, political, cultural)’ from 
its relations with non-Western societies?’ It is a good question. But revealingly, none of the 
critics of the Eurocentrism of V&C – of its alleged ‘civilizational isolationism’ and 
‘metropolitan diffusionism’ (see Go, this issue) -- provides convincing examples of powerful 
non-European influences on the ways in which Europeans configured notions of 
civilization.
36
 Overwhelmingly, the emphasis is on extra-European forces that had a major 
impact on the ‘rise of the West’ and on European economic and political development. For 
instance, Hobson stresses the impact of Chinese inventions with respect to the metal-barrelled 
guns that could fire metal bullets on the ‘Western military revolution’. However, the question 
of whether such technology first appeared in Sheffield or Shanghai is not obviously relevant 
to an investigation into the emergence and development of the more specific phenomenon of 
European conceptions of civilization.
37
 Lawson makes a more salient point by arguing that a 
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 Linklater (2016), p. 126 and pp. 216ff.  Hobson (this issue) refers to Adam Watson’s claim 
in ‘a rare moment of “postcolonial sensibility”’ that the European consular system was 
directly influenced by ‘Ottoman diplomatic practices’). 
36
 Ling (this issue) gives the example of the Chinese Confucian influences on Matteo Ricci’s 
moral-religious thought. 
37
 Hobson contends that it is problematic to separate state-formation and the ‘civilizing 
process’ from the broader ‘rise of the West’ and so it is essential to emphasise non-European 
influences on those phenomena. But the emphasis of V&C is on how the rise of territorial 
states with their monopoly controls of violence and the right of taxation led to radical shifts in 
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more detailed analysis of the slave testimonials which are discussed in V&C would shed light 
on non-European agency (see also Ling, this issue).
38
 Along with the studies of the Haitian 
revolt which are reported by Go, Ling and Çapan, such investigations may well contribute to 
explaining how Europeans constructed unique discourses of progress and civilization. But 
there is considerable sociological research to undertake to explain the processes through 
which outside influences shaped such narratives within the European powers. It is not enough 
to assert that those non-European forces helped to shape the overall course of the ‘civilizing 
process’. Indeed, not least because of the power disparities between European and non-
European groups, it is necessary to explain exactly how extra-European political 
developments had a direct impact on ideas of civilization. An example which is discussed in 
V&C, albeit briefly, is how slave testimonials became entangled with inter-related domestic 
and international power struggles in ‘civilized’ societies to abolish the Atlantic slave trade 
and eradicate chattel slavery.
39
 Paradoxically, this is an area where, in Hobson’s words, the 
processual argument of V&C may contribute to the postcolonial critique of Western 
civilization.  
Exactly how V&C came to be read as an ‘untimely’ grand narrative about the rise of 
the West is a matter that is best left to the critics. However, it is useful to note in the quest for 
an explanation that the idea of ‘civilization’ is an instance of what Elias called a ‘praise word’ 
that the European ruling elites and then populations more generally used to celebrate their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
global power balances that were directly expressed in the rise of the European overseas 
empires. V&C stresses the importance of European contrasts with non-European cultures for 
the ‘civilizing process’ without assuming that crucial dimensions of European state-formation 
and economic and military development owed nothing to extra-European developments.  
38
 Lawson refers to the discussion in Linklater (2016), pp. 256-8.  
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 Linklater (2016), pp. 251ff. 
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‘superiority’ over non-Europeans. Social-scientific examinations of civilization and the 
‘civilizing process’ may therefore arouse the suspicion that they are underpinned by 
pernicious binaries between ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ peoples (Mennell, this issue). 
Analysts may easily fall into a trap of their own making by searching for evidence that seems 
to support initial preconceptions or prejudices.
40
 In fact, process sociology contributes to the 
critique of ‘civilization’ by examining in a relatively-detached way – by explicitly eschewing 
questions of praise and blame – how Europeans came to regard themselves as uniquely 
civilized with all the attendant ambiguities. No assumptions about any ‘pre-determined point 
of origin’ and about subsequent patterns of change in which ‘civilizing processes’ inevitably 
triumph over countervailing ‘decivilizing’ trends exist in that perspective or in V&C (see 
Lawson, this issue). No assumptions are made about what Ling (this issue) describes as the 
logic of ‘self-rectification’ in ‘civilized’ societies which secures moral progress despite, if not 
through, the suffering of others. A closer reading of the section of V&C which is devoted to 
‘organised irresponsibility’ – the possible ‘Achilles heel’ of the modern states-system – 
should have dispelled those myths.
41
 One of the main purposes of the volume was to initiate a 
sociological analysis of changing balances of power between the ambiguous properties of the 
‘civilized’ self images which emerged in Europe and which were subsequently exported by 
colonial expansion aided by mimetic non-European ‘civilizing’ offensives to other regions of 
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the world. Such an investigation is very far removed from a ‘triumphalist’, teleological 
account of the ‘rise of the West’. 
 
The Question of Eurocentrism 
There is an easy transition from reading V&C as an account of the rise of the West to the 
accusation of Eurocentrism. Process sociologists are all too familiar with the line of attack. In 
his procataleptic article, Stephen Mennell, battle-hardened by decades of explaining Elias’s 
work and defending core arguments from misguided critics, underlines the value of the 
distinction between Europe-centred and Eurocentric explanation. Elias’s examination of the 
‘civilizing process’ and my process-sociological exploration of violence and civilization are 
examples of the first standpoint. Elias’s analysis of the ‘civilizing process’ attempted to 
explain the distinctive, but not entirely unique features of European ‘civilization’ which he 
linked with state-formation, substantial internal pacification, increasing revulsion towards 
various forms of violence or cruelty within ‘civilized’ societies, and the persistence of much 
more permissive attitudes to the use of force in the relations between states. It was expressly 
stated that Europe is not the only region that has undergone a long ‘civilizing process’ in the 
technical, etic sense of the term which Mennell explains in this Forum. For example, one 
characteristic of the European ‘civilizing process’ – the ‘taming of the warriors’ – had taken 
place much earlier in China
42
 (which is why Chong’s discussion of distinctive Southeast 
Asian ‘civilizing processes’ is a fascinating contribution to the Forum). In an amusing aside, 
Elias added that some Chinese observers were shocked to learn that ‘civilized’ Europeans ate 
with ‘swords’.43 Process sociologists therefore recognise the existence of multiple ‘civilizing 
processes’ with different ‘standards of civilization’ and interlinked notions of ‘barbarism’. 
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They do not naively assume that the sociological categories that were used to explain the 
European ‘civilizing process’ can be applied automatically to the study of non-European 
counterparts.
44
 That is the force of the distinction between Europe-centred and Euro-centric 
modes of sociological inquiry.  
 As Hobson argues in his introduction, landing the blow as far as the accusation of 
Eurocentrism is concerned is more difficult than the critics in this Forum realise.
45
 
Elaborating the point, he distinguishes between two types of Eurocentrism: ‘Eurocentrism I’ 
(the ‘big bang thesis’ mentioned earlier which ignores the role of non-Western agency in the 
making of the West and in the making of the Western international order) and ‘Eurocentrism 
II’ (which he regards as more useful for assessing the argument of V&C because the 
perspective focuses solely on the role of Western imperial agency in the formation of the 
modern world system). Exponents of ‘Eurocentrism II’ including Immanuel Wallerstein have 
argued against granting non-European agency a major place in the explanation of the rise of 
the modern world-system, one that would contradict the historical evidence. To inflate their 
role, it is claimed, is to distract attention from highly uneven power distributions and 
capacities to shape global political and economic structures. The standpoint resonates with 
core arguments in process sociology and chimes with Bull and Watson’s reflections on how 
the combined development of international society and colonial expansion that began in the 
final part of the fifteenth century endured until the end of the Second World War ‘by which 
time European dominance was clearly at an end and the global international system, while 
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still evolving, was being shaped less by Europeans than by others’.46 Considered in that light, 
Lawson’s reference to Gandhi’s sardonic response to the question of what he thought of 
Western civilization (namely that ‘it would be a good idea’) works against rather than for the 
critique of V&C. As the idea of ‘Eurocentrism II’ makes clear, the idea of civilization was 
developed by European ruling elites and promoted through colonial expansion to non-
European elites that were pressed to internalise European images of their inferiority, which is 
exactly what many did. As Gandhi’s statement implied, there was no ‘dialogue of 
civilizations’ with respect to the construction of European notions of ‘civilized’ existence or 
with regard to the justification of imperial ‘civilizing’ offensives. Given the power disparities 
between ‘the established and the outsiders’ in the colonial era, it would have been 
extraordinary if it had been otherwise.
47
 More even power relations had to appear before non-
Western peoples could secure a favourable hearing even for elementary claims that the 
principle of racial equality should be embedded in international society.
48
 As Bull and 
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 For a recent analysis, see A. Klotz, ‘Racial Equality’, in Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-
Smit (eds.), The Globalisation of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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non-Western influences on international society since the end of the Second World War (but 
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arrangement). My response is that shifts in global power balances over a longer period eroded 
assumptions that Europe possessed a monopoly of truth about ‘civilized’ existence. One of 
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Watson’s comments that were cited earlier make clear, significant increases in non-European 
agency had to await major inter-related shifts in the balance of power between the traditional 
imperial powers and the colonies and between the European great powers and the rising 
superpowers with their emphatic anti-colonial rhetoric. As a result of those power shifts, non-
Western peoples were able to extract various concessions from European societies that were 
consistent with (and often influenced by) earlier ‘civilized’ critiques of colonial domination. 
Curiously, Elias’s analysis of the process of civilization paid little attention to 
European colonial expansion which is so central to postcolonial analysis, a bias that V&C 
endeavoured to correct. The neglect of Europe’s relations with non-European peoples is a 
long-standing criticism of Elias’s position. Several years ago, Jack Goody who was not a 
reliable guide to Elias’s explanation of the ‘civilizing process’, maintained that it rested on ‘a 
purely European genealogy of learning’ which ignored all extra-European influences.49 But 
that internal genealogy may have been substantially correct as far as the explanation of the 
transformation of European manners and attitudes to violence and cruelty is concerned 
(although there is certainly much more to be said about Europe’s relations with non-European 
peoples). To develop the point it is useful to turn to a powerful critique of Elias that has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the consequences was that the ‘standard of civilization’ more or less disappeared from 
official Western discourse and not least because of the greater scope for non-Western agency 
in the post-Second World era - which is not to argue that the underlying ideas simply 
vanished. I discuss those issues in a book provisionally entitled, The Idea of Civilization in 
World Politics: States, Empires and International Society, which is nearing completion.  
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 Jack Goody, Renaissances: The One or the Many? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 59. See the critique of Goody’s perspective in Katie Liston and Stephen 
Mennell, ‘Ill Met in Ghana: Progress and Process in Goody and Elias’, Theory, Culture and 
Society, 26: 7-8 (2009), pp. 52-70. 
25 
 
advanced by a leading process sociologist. The contention is that, with the exception of ‘a 
few passages in On the Process of Civilization, we do not get a very clear sense…that at the 
very time that civilization was developing in Western Europe, it was busily spreading itself 
over the whole globe in the most violent of ways, so that it is not unfair to say that the 
ritualized civility of European court society was built on the blood of murdered “primitives” 
and bought with the land, labour and raw materials which marauding Europeans plundered 
from “their” empires’.50 The argument continues that, throughout the Eliasian explanation of 
the state’s monopolization of violence, there is surprisingly little discussion ‘of what states 
actually did with that monopoly, in relation to both their own populations and those of the 
parts of the world they set about colonizing. Elias himself, for example, spoke of the “spread” 
of Western civilization, the “transformation of Oriental or African peoples in the direction of 
Western standards”, and the “integration” of the rest of the world within European standards 
of behaviour as an essential element of the “civilization of the colonized” in a way which 
glossed over exactly how violent a process that really was’.51 To construct a more complex 
analysis of European civilization, it is maintained, it is essential ‘to supplement, 
systematically, the concept of ‘civilizing processes’ with that of ‘civilizing offensives’, to 
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 Robert van Krieken, ‘The Barbarism of Civilization: Cultural Genocide and the “Stolen 
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take account of the active, conscious and deliberate civilizing projects of both various 
powerful groups within societies and whole societies in relation to other regions of the 
world’.52  
That powerful critique of Elias’s analysis of the ‘civilizing process’ is advanced as 
part of a discussion of how European settlers behaved towards indigenous peoples in 
Australia, and specifically with reference to the ‘stolen generation’. The analysis has been 
extended by countless historical studies of violence on the periphery. The idea of ‘civilizing 
offensives’ and the related ‘standard of civilization’ which Europeans invoked to justify the 
transformation of ‘semi-civilized’ and ‘savage’ societies demonstrates that process-
sociological investigation displays some of the hallmarks of ‘Eurocentrism II’. But the 
analysis also contributes to understanding presumed features of V&C which have been 
criticised from postcolonial standpoints, specifically ‘civilizational isolationism’ and the 
‘abyssal’ approach to Western civilization. Intriguing is Elias’s observation which Chong 
cites in his paper that the idea of civilization ‘sums up everything in which Western society of 
the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or “more primitive” 
contemporary ones. By this term, Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its 
special character and what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of its manners, 
the development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more’.53 It is not 
at all clear why Elias chose to italicise the principal objects of European pride, but certainly the 
effect was to describe a central feature of European ‘civilized’ self-images which was the 
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assurance that various practices were their achievements alone (and that non-European peoples 
had played no part in their creation). The statement effectively describes the emergence of an 
‘abyssal’ image of a civilization that was set apart from and raised above all others, a process 
that is clearly central to postcolonial analysis (see Çapan, this issue). Massive power 
inequalities underpinned European civilizational arrogance. Those disparities underpinned 
the delusion that their civilization was equivalent to a natural or biological endowment which 
was entirely immune from reversal. One of the consequences was a collective lack of 
preparedness for the ‘regression to barbarism’ that occurred under National Socialism where, 
as discussed in V&C, colonial violence was imported back into Europe.
54
 The upshot is that 
Çapan’s claim that ‘”European” history and that of the colonies is bifurcated’ in V&C is 
unfounded. 
But the belief in civilizational superiority underpinned not only European initiatives 
to force other societies to comply with the ‘standard of civilization’. It also led in an era of 
massive global power asymmetries to the plethora of late nineteenth century non-Western 
‘civilizing offensives’ that were designed to emulate what was often admired in the ‘level of 
their technology, in their manners, in the development of their scientific knowledge or view 
of the world, and much more’. That is not to suggest that non-Western ‘modernising’ elites 
were uncritical of Western civilization – of its devotion to greed and accumulation as 
opposed to virtue from the standpoint of Confucian intellectuals, and its barrenness from the 
perspective of Japanese and Ottoman intellectuals who took pride in the deeper spirituality of 
indigenous belief-systems. Nevertheless, various regimes promoted secondary ‘civilizing 
offensives’ which, in the case of Japan, Russia and the Ottomans, employed forms of mimetic 
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imperialism to demonstrate an eagerness to take part in the larger global ‘civilizing mission’ 
of bringing ‘progress’ to ‘backward’ peoples. Mimetic imperialism was one of the main ways 
in which non-Western political agency promoted the dissemination of Western conceptions 
of civilization. What has been described as ‘Ottoman Orientalism’ or ‘Russian Orientalism’ 
refers to non-European ‘civilizing offensives’ that are not easily subsumed under the ideas of 
Eurocentrism I and II.
55
 The notion of non-Western Orientalist ‘civilizing’ initiatives 
describes the process in which non-Western elites emulated in distinctive and varied ways 
Western legal-rational state structures, diplomatic codes, ‘rationalised’ economies as well as 
bureaucratised armed forces that could engage in Western modes of warfare and, not least, 
compete effectively in the longer-term with the dominant Western powers. Non-Western 
agency within the constraints of the imperial great power ‘establishment’ resulted in the 
universalisation of core features of the ‘civilizing process’ including ‘the globalisation of 
international society’. 56  The ‘Europe-centred’ analysis of the relationship between state-
formation and the ‘civilizing process’ (extended to investigate the rise of overseas empires 
and the development of international society) explains how humanity as whole was driven in 
that direction with all the ambiguities that were discussed earlier. A process-sociological 
examination of those established-outsider relations can illuminate global social and political 
dynamics that are largely missing from the postcolonial contributions to this Forum. 
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Process sociology and postcolonialism 
The discussion has attempted to turn the tables on the postcolonial critique of V&C by 
showing how process sociology contributes to understanding the ‘abyssal’ image of Western 
civilization in addition to the rise of European assumptions about ‘civilizational isolationism’ 
and ‘metropolitan diffusionism’. Its long-term perspective explains the emergence of notions 
of civilizational superiority which shaped the colonial era and continue to influence world 
politics in the ‘post-colonial’ era. The significance of the analysis of the ‘civilizing process’ 
for postcolonial investigations will be apparent, but it is possible to extend the argument to 
show how the working principles of process sociology shed much light on the rise of 
postcolonial sensibilities in the first place (and promote an understanding of the concerns 
about ‘Eurocentrism’ that run through much of the Forum). Notable is the analysis of power 
balances or ‘ratios’ and established-outsider relations in social figurations. The following 
summary of the basic method of process sociology emphasises the central themes. When 
studying the relations between groups of people, the argument is, it is necessary to analyse 
‘the central balance of power’ noting, specifically, how far particular groups succeeded in 
monopolising key social and political resources, thereby forcing other strata to be dependent 
on them. In conditions in which power capabilities are ‘very uneven’, it is also imperative ‘to 
be alert for the operation of group charisma and group disgrace, the process of stigmatisation, 
the absorption of the established group’s view of the world within the very conscience and 
we-image of the outsiders, producing a high measure of resignation even though the tensions 
remain’. But when power balances are ‘becoming more equal’, analysts should expect to 
observe open ‘rebellion, resistance, emancipation’ amongst traditional outsider groups.57 
Those observations about the method of process-sociological investigation are invaluable for 
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analyses of power struggles within and between societies as well as tensions in other 
figurations such as academic disciplines that are relevant to the arguments of this Forum’s 
postcolonial critics.  
Those interdependencies are clear in the case of postcolonial studies which reflect 
changing power balances between the traditional imperial establishment and the ‘outsiders’ 
consisting of the former colonised societies. Earlier practices in which the dominant groups 
claimed to have a monopoly of truth on ‘civilized’ existence and pressurised outsiders to 
internalise assumptions about their intrinsic ‘barbarism’ or savagery’ were contested in the 
course of the twinned ‘revolt against the West’ and reassertion of ‘traditional’ narratives and 
values.
58
 Revisionist ‘national’ histories have been a major part of that process as have recent 
attempts to construct ‘post-European’ or ‘post-Western’ world histories. In International 
Relations, related developments include the reconsideration of the classical English School 
investigation of the expansion of international society, the broader postcolonial critique of 
Western IR with its persistent neglect of non-Western perspectives, and emergent images of a 
‘post-Western’ discipline. Critiques of ‘Eurocentrism I’ and sensitivities to any academic 
standpoint that seems to hark back to ‘civilizational isolationism’ and to overlook ‘subaltern’ 
voices belong to the ‘revisionist’ narratives that emerged as power balances between the 
‘established and the outsiders’ became less uneven. Tensions within fields of study can be 
intensified alongside changing power distributions within scholarly communities as well as in 
global politics. An attendant danger is the stigmatisation of academic standpoints that are 
judged to be on the ‘wrong side’ by virtue of supposed commitments to Eurocentrism that 
downplay the role of non-Western agency in world politics (even though that presumption 
may not square with a more ‘detached’ and less ‘involved’ engagement with inconvenient 
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evidence).
59
 Again, the phenomenon needs to be considered in long-term perspective to 
highlight the ways in which established groups dismissed and stigmatised social ‘inferiors’ 
and attempted to convince them of their diminished social worth and lesser human value.
60
 
Revised narratives of the kind that exist in this Forum that discard hegemonic views are often 
central to the politics of restoring self-esteem to subordinated groups. But the reciprocated 
stigmatisation of perspectives that are deemed to be hostile or unsympathetic to traditional 
outsiders may well emerge alongside shifting power balances in social figurations. The 
phenomenon is evident in Ling’s argument that V&C is informed by and reinforces 
‘Hypermasculine Eurocentric Whiteness’. 'The critique, which is full of ‘outrage’ and 
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 Regrettably, Ling deleted a section from an earlier version of her article which shed 
interesting light on this dimension of established/outsider dynamics in International Relations 
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process-sociological terms an invitation from a member of an established group to internalise 
feelings of inferiority (see the comments on the working method of process sociology on p. 
29 above). The reported exchange resonates with a central theme in the approach which is 
that the analysis of specific practices can illuminate large-scale social processes. Not only 
does process sociology provide insights into the connections between established-outsider 
relations at different levels; it operates critically in an image of ‘the sociologist as a hunter of 
myths’ that underpin and maintain such power relations (see Norbert Elias, What is 
Sociology?, Dublin: University College Dublin Press, ch. 2). In that way, process sociology 
can contribute to the ‘postcolonial critique of Western civilization’ by analysing the 
established-outsider dynamics that Ling highlights in this Forum. On that basis, I invite 
postcolonial scholars to regard process sociology not as a foe but as an ally. 
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‘disgust’ in Ling’s terminology in this Forum, demonstrates how ‘highly-involved’ world-
views can gain the upper hand over ‘detachment’ in ‘academic’ power struggles'.61  
It has been argued that the significance of process sociology for critical inquiries has 
suffered because of the plain fact that Elias did not wear his heart on his sleeve. The 
disavowal of political affiliations and the advocacy of non-partisan sociology, the thesis is, 
clash with the openly ‘critical-theoretical’ aspirations that run through several branches of 
social-scientific inquiry that are well represented in this Forum.
62
 Those observations raise 
important questions about how far the critics of V&C object to an apparent identification with 
the ‘wrong team’ in ongoing struggles between the ‘established’ and the ‘outsiders’. Deep 
issues are at stake here which require some comments on the relationship between process 
sociology and critical theory as constructed in the two volumes on ‘the problem of harm’. 
The first point to make is that processual analysis combines a commitment to relatively-
detached inquiry (‘relatively-detached’ because complete detachment is an impossibility) 
with humanistic (or left-leaning, cosmopolitan) affiliations. A central premise is that greater 
sociological detachment and the quest for ‘reality-congruent knowledge’ can provide the 
foundations for political interventions that enable people to exercise greater control over 
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largely-unregulated and unplanned processes (and for criticising modes of analysis or 
interventions that come with a high risk of compounding rather than alleviating human 
problems). But the immediate task is to understand more about power relations and power 
struggles, established-outsider dynamics, patterns of stigmatisation and counter-
stigmatisation and other forces that have repeatedly trapped social groups in processes that 
they have often been unable to comprehend, let alone control. Crucially, the aspiration is to 
improve the human rather than national means of orientation to the social world in the light of 
those long-term aspirations.
63
 It is necessary to add that the claim that Elias embraced 
‘methodological nationalism’ is erroneous but understandable given the fact that those 
specialist dimensions of process sociology have not been discussed at length in International 
Relations (Lawson, this issue). 
The second point is that, as Chong stresses in this Forum, the analysis of harm 
conventions in PoH and the study of violence and civilization in V&C are indeed connected 
with critical social theory.
64
 With that in mind, this section ends with a brief response to 
Hobson’s argument for a stronger normative commitment to trans-cultural dialogue but one 
that eschews Kant’s cosmopolitanism given the persistence of racist themes in his writings.65 
I would need to return to the relevant scholarly literature before commenting further on that 
issue, but a preliminary judgment is that the jury may have yet to reach a final verdict. 
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 See Mennell (this issue). For that reason, the analysis of violence and civilization aims to 
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However, from the standpoint of process sociology, Hobson’s summary of the ‘Kant/Herder 
debate’ on whether all cultures have ‘intrinsic worth’ reflects a transformative moment in the 
development of ‘civilized’ self-images in which many Enlightenment thinkers developed a 
more self-critical view of their ‘civilization’, considering its main characteristics including its 
colonial practices as if ‘from outside’. 66  As argued in V&C, Georg Foster and others 
constructed a more detached standpoint on Eurocentric distinctions between the ‘civilized’ 
and the ‘savage’ as part of the quest to understand ‘humanity from as many different 
perspectives as possible’.67 A major step was taken towards recognising the multiplicity of 
‘civilizing processes’ and promoting analyses of cultural varieties which combined greater 
detachment with pronounced cosmopolitan sympathies.
68
 The following discussion reflects 
the spirit of that phase of the European ‘civilizing process’. 
 
Future Avenues of Research 
Engaging with the critics has encouraged further reflections on five possible lines of future 
research on ‘civilizing processes’ in world politics. They are outlined here in the attempt to 
promote discussion and debate about how elements of process sociology, the English School 
and postcolonialism can be woven together in more synoptic studies of long-term patterns of 
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social and political development. The different standpoints do not meet as equals. A recurrent 
theme in process sociology is that different fields of investigation tend to follow their 
separate trajectories with the result that synthesis usually lags behind specialist analysis. Elias 
operated on a very broad large canvass by endeavouring not just to integrate major themes 
drawn from different spheres of social-scientific inquiry but also to build bridges with the 
biological sciences to explain very long patterns of human development.
69
 He is reported to 
have believed that processual analysis had the ‘right of way’ over narrowly-focused 
perspectives in part because of the capacity to promote very high levels of synthesis geared 
towards improving the human means of orientation.
70
 This is not the place to assess the claim 
although it will be clear where my sympathies lie. Rather, the objective is to follow its lead 
by considering lines of research that draw together elements of three perspectives which are 
the focal point of the Forum in order to contribute new themes to ongoing efforts to forge 
connections between historical sociology and International Relations. The five areas of 
investigation are as follows: 
 
1 The discussion of Eurocentrism in the Forum underlines the need for empirical 
research on non-European influences on European conceptions of ‘civilized existence’ which 
emerged in the late eighteenth century in the context of the long history of ‘inter-
civilizational’ relations and imperial conquest. Such inquiries can complement existing 
studies of extra-European economic and technological breakthroughs that are significant for 
understanding the ‘rise of the West’. Future research may well extend Elias’s inquiry into the 
processes that shaped the ways in which Europeans came to regard themselves as uniquely 
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civilized although the supposition here is that intra-European deliberations on the nature of 
‘civilization’ will remain at the centre of the inquiry.  
 
2 Earlier reflections on the distinction between Eurocentrism I and II led to a brief 
discussion of non-Western mimetic ‘civilizing offensives’ which invite the further 
broadening of the analysis. Existing studies of such initiatives in Japan, China, Siam, Tsarist 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire have analysed what were often deeply-divisive non-
European initiatives to reform political structures in accordance with an alien ‘standard of 
civilization’. Sociological explorations of interwoven national and global established-outsider 
relations can enrich inquiries into the relations between the impact of colonisation on non-
Western societies, the subsequent expansion of international society, and the unfinished 
dimensions of the ‘revolt against the West’.  
  
3 Further broadening the discussion, such investigations require advances in the 
comparative sociology of Western and non-Western ‘civilizing processes’.71 Elias’s analysis 
of the European ‘civilizing process’ is standard-setting in that it reveals how such inquiries 
might be constructed and explains key concepts that can inform the analysis (which is not to 
assume that the framework can be applied without amendment to other historical cases in 
what would certainly constitute Eurocentrism).
72
 Elias speculated that court societies in 
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different regions might hold the key to understanding non-Western ‘civilizing processes’.73 
More empirical research is needed to test that hypothesis and to ascertain how far the relevant 
standards of ‘civilized’ behaviour developed more or less autonomously within separate court 
arrangements or as part of movements within larger ‘supranational’ court figurations.74  
 
4 Such investigations can advance the comparative study of states-systems which was 
developed by Wight, or the sociology of ‘civilizing processes’ within those figurations.75 
Research in this area remains in its infancy which makes Chong’s erudite article on pre-
colonial Southeast Asia especially welcome. Particularly challenging, as far as the argument 
of V&C is concerned, is the thesis that very different dynamics from the ones that shaped the 
Western states-system existed in the region. The contention is that because of distinctive 
cultural forces, Southeast Asia avoided the violent encounters that have dominated 
international politics in the West. Chong’s conjecture is that it may not have been the only 
region that escaped the European configuration of violence and civilization. Intriguing 
questions are raised about how far the framework of analysis that was employed in V&C to 
analyse the Western states-systems can be applied to Southeast Asia and other areas (not that 
the volume made that extravagant claim). Interestingly, in the light of the preceding 
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paragraph which referred to the relationship between court societies and civilizations, 
Chong’s discussion holds that a ‘culture of nobility’ exercised constraints on ‘untrammelled 
violence’ in relations between interwoven court societies. However, the analysis seems to sail 
perilously close to cultural reductionism. Questions immediately arise about whether the key 
concepts used in process-sociological studies of figurations (including power ratios, 
established-outsider dynamics, modes of stigmatisation, struggles for emancipation and so 
forth) can be used to explain core dynamics in that region and in other international societies. 
Those are issues that the comparative analysis of global ‘civilizing processes’ needs to 
examine. 
 
5 Those investigations can be conducted as part of the larger project of forging 
connections between the study of international systems and world history.
76
 They can attempt 
to explain a central overall trend in the history of human groups which is their incorporation 
in longer chains of interconnectedness. Struggles between states, their territorial enlargement, 
and colonial expansion have been amongst the main driving forces behind that direction of 
travel. The ways in which societies have developed the instruments of force and the extent to 
which they have succeeded in controlling violence in the relations with each other (in short, 
collective responses to ‘the problem of harm in world politics’) have shaped ‘civilizing 
processes’ that have come to affect humanity as a whole. Understanding how societies dealt 
with the challenges of interconnectedness in the past has a valuable role to play in advancing 
the human means of orientation in the current era – in comprehending how societies can 
collaborate to promote a global ‘civilizing process’ which ends, or at least greatly reduces, 
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the violence that dominated the Western states-systems and which is a continuing part of their 
global legacy.  
The contributions to the Forum raise deep questions about combining the strengths of 
process sociology and English School inquiry in order to comprehend the relationship 
between violence and civilization in the Western states-systems. The most critical articles 
challenge core assumptions from postcolonial standpoints. The response has been that the 
more robust challenges rest on basic misunderstandings of the core argument of V&C and its 
process-sociological foundations (which are expertly discussed in Mennell’s contribution to 
the Forum). This section has endeavoured to broaden the investigation by explaining how 
process sociology, the English School and postcolonialism can advance the inquiry into 
‘civilizing processes’ in world politics. The aim has been to raise the stakes in this discussion 
by outlining some future lines of investigation.  
A final comment is that there is a paucity of research on those different areas and 
almost no investigation of how future inquiries can be brought together in a large-scale 
exploration of ‘civilizing processes’. Countless research projects that draw on scholarly 
expertise in different parts of the world are needed to make significant advances. Large 
research teams are essential to undertake and integrate diverse areas of research over long 
time-scales as part of the quest to promote ‘global IR’ and ‘global social science’. The 
requisite research institutions, academic cultures and necessary sources of research funding 
are not in place. That may or may not change over the coming decades. But perhaps there is 
progress in describing the scale of the challenge and in charting some future directions. 
 
 
